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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AND INSURANCE LITIGATIONj
Edwin M. Borchard*
HE passage of the Federal De-claratory Judgments Act in 1934has stimulated throughout the
country the employment of the action
for declaratory judgment.1  In few
branches of commercial activity has it
been used more successfully than in
insurance litigation.
It would be hard to say whether this
new device for the construction of
written instruments and the clarifica-
tion and adjudication of all types of
legal relations has been more effec-
tively used for the determination of
disputed status, the construction of con-
tracts, conflicting claims to property, or
administrative law disputes between
the Government and the citizen. In the
federal courts, however, claims by an
alleged infringer of a patent praying a
declaratory judgment of non-infringe-
ment and petitions by insurance com-
panies asserting. an immunity from
threatened claims and demands, have
for very practical reasons afforded a
substantial exemplification of the new
judicial relief made available by the
declaratory judgment.
t This article is based in part on an address
delivered before the Insurance Section of the
1938 American Bar Association Convention.
* Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale
University; Draftsman, Federal Declaratory
Judgments Act on Federal Rule 57; Co-drafts-
The construction of all kinds of con-
tracts before or after breach is one of
the special functions of the declaratory
action. This procedure is especially ap-
propriate to insurance contracts, at the
initiative either of the insured, insurer,
or third party, because insurance poli-
cies are often of long duration, look to
future benefits, involve fiduciary rela-
tionships, depend on representations,
facts and conduct which the company
finds it difficult to control, and in the
event of loss, create new relationships
between insurer and the injured per-
son or beneficiary and the insured or
principal debtor. The multiplicity of
clauses in such a contract, whether
voluntary or statutory, seeking to safe-
guard many contingencies, necessarily
gives much occasion for construction
and interpretation, especially in the
case of casualty policies.
In addition, certain economic and
social facts have played a part in en-
couraging resort to declaratory rather
than coercive relief. On the part of the
insured or beneficiary, a declaration of
liability against a company as respon-
man, Uniform Act on Declaratory Judgments.
1Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Texas,
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sible as most insurance companies is as
effective as a money judgment or co-
ercive relief, and it is cheaper, speedier
and more efficient. Numerous actions
have been brought simply to declare in
force a policy from which a company
sought to escape by reason of alleged
breach by the insured. On the part of
the insurance company other consider-
ations operate. When a casualty com-
pany is a defendant or co-defendant
with the insured, juries are apt to be
partial to the plaintiff; hence insurers
have found great advantage in obtain-
ing a declaratory judgment in an in-
dependent and preliminary action to
the effect that there was "no coverage"
under the policy. Not only are they re-
lieved by a judgment in their favor
from defending a negligence action
against the insured, but the determina-
tion of the fundamental economic fact
that there is "no coverage" enlightens
and guides the injured person and the
insured. Indeed, such a determination
has basic importance for all parties
concerned in the negligence action,
whether an injunction against its con-
tinuance is issued or not, for a suit
against an impecunious insured unsup-
ported by a responsible insurer may not
be pursued, or the indifference of the
insured may be converted into self-
reliant defense. Inasmuch as this phe-
nomenon presents the most striking
application of the new procedure, its
examination will occupy the greater
part of this paper.
Resort to declaratory adjudication
does not require any purported breach
of contractual relations, as coercive
remedies generally presuppose. Indeed,
one of its functions is to clarify disputed
legal relations so as to make breach un-
necessary. It authorizes adjudication by
the courts whenever a useful purpose
is served by settling the issue and re-
moving the doubt, uncertainty and in-
security which gave rise to the dis-
pute. Naturally, that criterion affords
some discretion to the judges, but the
discretion is limited by rule.
It is perhaps not surprising that a
new remedy, even if new in name only,
should have aroused hostility in some
courts whose judges, not familiar with
English practice, had not heard the
term "declaratory judgments" or "de-
claratory relief" in their student days.
Lawyers as a rule are inhospitable to
novelty, whether real or apparent. It
had been assumed that the procedural
writs of common law and equity had
exhausted the possibilities of judicial
relief and that, in spite of the fact that
many disputes disclosed an unsatisfied
need for adjudication which neither
common law nor equity afforded, the
absence of traditional writs or rem-
edies made it impossible to meet the
need. Even when state after state, on
demonstration of the need and proof
that a great proportion of the English
cases seek nothing but a declaration of
rights, had passed the necessary statutes
authorizing declaratory judgments, sev-
eral courts in this country evidenced
their inhospitality toward procedural
improvements by giving the statute a
restricted or indeed improper construc-
tion. It is unnecessary to review the
unfortunate dicta of the United States
Supreme Court before the enactment
of the Federal Act, when some of the
judges mistakenly assumed that a de-
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opinion on a hypothetical state of facts,
and failed to realize that a useful social
purpose is served by deciding a legal
dispute before breach and even before
the threat of an irreparable injury mak-
ing the issue ripe for injunction. We
owe much to the initiative and diplo-
macy of Justices Stone and Hughes for
redeeming the earlier vagaries of the
Court and for giving the "new" pro-
cedure an understanding endorsement
which has carried it to ever greater
usefulness throughout the country.2
Nevertheless, two judicial errors
make their appearance with distressing
frequency, and insurance cases often
exemplify them. One is to assume that
when another remedy is available, a
declaratory judgment may not be in-
voked. This is not a mere error in in-
2 Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v.
Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933); Aetna Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1937).
3To avoid the Pennsylvania and Michigan
error, the new federal rules provide: "The exist-
ence of another adequate remedy does not pre-
clude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate." Rule 57.
4 Nesbitt v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance
Co., 310 Pa. 374, 165 AUt. 403 (1933); Wolverine
Mutual Motor Insurance Co. v. Clark, 277 Mich.
633, 270 N. W. 167 (1936). Cf. Utica Mutual In-
surance Co. v. Beers Chevrolet Co., 294 N. Y. S.
82 (1937). Perhaps the Pennsylvania view is the
least excusable of all. Seeking to avoid the mis-
construction of Section 6 of the Uniform Act by
which "the court may refuse to render or enter
a declaratory judgment or decree where such
judgment or decree if rendered or entered
would not terminate the uncertainty or contro-
versy giving rise to the proceeding," under
which Section the Pennsylvania courts had in
a number of cases decided that the declaratory
judgment was not to be granted if any other
remedy was available and thus compelled dis-
tressed litigants to start their case over again
under a procedure more agreeable to the judges,
ex-Chief Justice von Moschzisker proposed a
statutory amendment designed to clarify the
limits of discretion under Section 6. The de-
claratory judgment was to be refused only
when a special statutory remedy was provided
for that special type of case, or naturally, when
no settlement of the issue would result. It spe-
cifically provided that the mere existence of a
common law or equitable remedy was to be no
terpretation, but a flat violation of the
precise terms of the statutes, which pro-
vide that a declaratory judgment may
be sought and obtained "whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed."
That is to say, whether a coercive rem-
edy like damages, injunction or specific
performance (1) is also claimed, (2)
could be claimed but is not claimed, or
(3) could not be claimed, the declara-
tory judgment may not on that ground
be denied. Could any statute be plainer
than that?3 Courts then, like those of
Pennsylvania and Michigan which on
occasion have construed the declara-
tory judgment as an extraordinary
remedy, not to be granted if any other
remedy is available, are misconstruing
the statute in its clearest terms.4 It
should make no difference to courts
bar to the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
Thereupon, some possibly well-intentioned leg-
islator in the Pennsylvania Committee on Judi-
ciary General undertook to confuse what was
perfectly clear by adding a further amendment
reading:
"but the case is not ripe for relief by way of
such common law remedy, or extraordinary
legal remedy, or where the party asserting the
claim, relation, status, right or privilege, and
who might bring action thereon, refrains from
pursuing any of the last mentioned remedies."
The draftsman probably meant to help out
Judge von Moschzisker's amendment by specifi-
cation, and not to nullify it. Cf. Borchard in 10
Temple L. Quar. 233, at 234-7. Yet nullification
is what the Pennsylvania courts have accom-
plished, for they have held that a declaratory
judgment can only be sought when the case is
not ripe for a common law remedy (how about
an equitable remedy?) a result which is pre-
cisely what the original amendment was in-
tended to avoid. In fact, this construction has
greatly narrowed the scope of declaratory judg-
ments in Pennsylvania. It is surprising that the
Pennsylvania bar has not protested against this
judicial error. Allegheny County v. Equitable
Gas Co., 321 Pa. 127, 183 Atl. 916. Oberts v.
Blickens, 198 At. 481 (Pa. Superior, 1938), in-
sisting that a declaratory action for construction
of a will involving a title to real estate should
be tried in an action of ejectment. Cf. the simi-
lar New York case of Woollard v. Schaffer
Stores Co., 272 N. Y. 304, 5 N. E. (2d) 829 (1936),
tried by declaratory action. If applied literally,
the Pennsylvania view will require a reversal
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through which door the litigants enter
the court room, so long as they are
properly there and the issue can be
conclusively and effectively deter-
mined., We still need wider apprecia-
tion of the fact that a person having a
drastic remedy at his disposal, may pre-
fer for any variety of social and eco-
nomic reasons the milder but for his
purposes equally effective judicial
declaration of his rights. This is espe-
cially true in the case of financially re-
sponsible defendants, for, needless to
say, the declaration, as res judicata,
can be enforced if disobeyed.
The other error, somewhat less com-
mon, is to assume that a litigant seek-
ing a declaration of non-liability, or
limited liability, does not present a
"cause of action" for judicial relief.
The bar has not fully appreciated the
fact, ancient in legal history, that an
unfounded claim is a cloud upon the
of those great Pennsylvania cases such as Karl-
her's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 At. 265 (1925);
Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pa.
507, 140 AUt. 506 (1928); Sullivan v. Ideal B. & L.
Assoc., 313 Pa. 407, 170 At. 263 (1934).
No other state courts have so seriously mis-
construed the Uniform Act, which was
designed to make the construction uniform
throughout the United States. That Act even in
Pennsylvania still provides that the declaratory
judgment shall be granted "whether or not fur-
ther relief is or could be claimed." The Penn-
sylvania idiosyncrasy should be corrected either
by repealing the 1935 Amendment or by restor-
ing it to the original form in which it was drawn
by Judge von Moschzisker. Circuit Judge
Parker of the fourth circuit, who like Judge
Hutcheson of the fifth circuit has been hospit-
able to declaratory relief and appreciates the
fact that the declaratory judgment is simply an
alternative remedy, (Stephenson v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc., 92 F. (2d) 406 (1937)), used
an unfortunate term in the Quarles case, 92 F.
(2d) 321 (1937) in describing declaratory relief
as "extraordinary." The Alabama Supreme
Court is subject to criticism for dismissing the
declaratory action of Barlowe v. Employers In-
surance Co., 188 So. 896 (Ala. 1939) because the
plaintiff could have sued as a third party bene-
ficiary.
5A denial of justice is occasionally perpe-
title, causing apprehension and distress
to the party charged and thus placed in
jeopardy, and giving him a legal inter-
est in its removal and in a declaration
of its invalidity. Thus, several courts
have failed to observe that even a po-
tential claim, such as the probable claim
of an injured person against the insured
and the insurance company, is sufficient
to cause apprehension and jeopardy
and thus to warrant the institution of
an action for a declaration of non-lia-
bility. Such a claim may be contin-
gent, in the sense that it has not yet
been brought, but human experience
indicates that it is so likely to be
brought as to justify making the injured
person a party defendant to an action
for a declaration that the plaintiff com-
pany is not liable under the policy.
District Judge Ragon in United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Pierson"
and Judge Lummus of Massachusetts
trated by the adherence of states like New Jer-
sey to the division between law and equity. It
is not always possible to guess whether a court
will consider a claim to be legal or equitable in
nature. In Springdale Corp. v. Fidelity Union
Trust Co., 121 N. J. L. 536, 3 A. (2d) 565 (1939),
the owners of an apartment house sued the
trustees of a mortgage for a declaratory judg-
ment that the plaintiffs and not the Trust Com-
pany were entitled to certain rents collected by
one Vanderlipp, President of the plaintiff or-
ganization and once agent of the defendant,
under agreement. While this looks like a claim
at law, the court held that whereas both plain-
tiff and defendant have legal claims against
Vanderlipp, their claims against each other are
equitable in nature; and that the action for a
declaratory judgment having been brought on
the law side must be dismissed. Such injustice
to the public is no longer possible in the federal
courts and the courts of most states, where pro-
ceedings need no longer be labelled legal or
equitable. The fact that the declaratory judg-
ment is neither strictly legal nor equitable has
served to expose the inefficiency and impropri-
ety of the old division, which has only a histor-
ical and no social justification. In cases like that
cited it is a positive evil, for which the publc
must pay.
6 21 F. Supp. 678 (D.C. W.D. Ark., 1937). This
decision seems to involve a complete misunder-
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in Merchants Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Leone,7 are therefore believed to be in
error in assuming, contrary to over-
whelming authority, that the issue be-
tween the company and the injured
person is not ripe for adjudication be-
cause no judgment has yet been ob-
tained by or against the insured or be-
cause there is only a "contingent future
possibility of disputes," or because, as
intimated in American Motorists Insur-
and Co. v. Busch," no suit has yet been
brought. This is to defeat one of the
main purposes of the declaratory judg-
ment, namely, to remove clouds from
legal relations before they have become
completed attacks or "disputes already
ripened." If there is a human proba-
bility that danger or jeopardy or preju-
dice impends from a certain quarter,
a sufficient legal interest has been cre-
ated to warrant a removal of the dan-
ger or threat. Naturally, some judg-
ment is required to determine whether
such danger is hypothetical or imagi-
nary only or whether it is actual and
material. It would seem that the prob-
able claims of an injured person under
the usual casualty policy can never be
deemed merely hypothetical or insuffi-
standing. The court considered that as recovery
from the company depended on final judgment
against the insured, the issue was not ripe for
adjudication between company and injured per-
son. The fact that claim on the company would
be practically inevitable made the issue "ripe"
for determination. The Circuit Court of Appeals
(Eighth Circuit) 97 F. (2d) 560 (1938) reversed
Judge Ragon's judgment.
79 N. E. (2d) 552 (Mass., 1937). In view of the
fact that Leone was an impecunious driver, that
the injured persons brought the action against
him only to establish the company's liability
under the policy and that Leone confessed judg-
ment, it seems strange for Justice Lummus to
suggest that the company's obligation to defend
is a matter of "minor importance," and that
there is no present dispute or continuing rela-
tion between the company and the injured per-
sons. At all times they are the only interested
ciently ripe for an adjudication of the
question of insurer's liability.
Claims of this type, which with
minor exceptions in equity, could not be
brought before declaratory relief was
made possible, led inhospitable courts
to some curious errors. The fact that
a suit was brought for a declaration of
immunity or non-liability led a few
lower federal courts, prior to the nota-
ble decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in the HaworthL case, to
conclude that immunity was not a
"right" within the meaning of the term
"rights and other legal relations"
which the courts were authorized to
declare.9 Even after the Supreme Court
had seemingly made it clear in the
Haworth case that freedom from a
claim asserted by a defendant is a
"legal relation," Circuit Judge Stone,
a distinguished federal judge, in his
dissenting opinion in Columbian Na-
tional Life Insurance Company v.
Foulke,10 still thought he found author-
ity in the Report of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee reporting out the fed-
eral Act for the view that freedom from
a duty (to defend or pay a claim) was
not intended to be included in the term
parties. The court's view lets form defeat sub-
stance, and appearance prevail over fact. See
Mr. F. W. Grinnell's able criticism of Justice
Lummus' opinion (1937) 22 Mass. Law Quar. 14;
yet Justice Lummus is one of the best informed
judges in the matter of declaratory judgments.
8 22 Fed. Supp. 72 (S. D. Cal. 1938), Jenney,
D. J.
9 Otis, J. in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Ha-
worth, 11 F. Supp. 1016 (1935), followed by
Brewster, J. in New York Life Insurance Co. v.
London, 15 F. Supp. 586 (1936), by Otis, J. in
Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v.
Foulke, 13 F. Supp. 350 (1936), and by Kenna-
mer, J. in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Marr,
21 F. Supp. 217 (N. D. Okla. 1937). These con-
clusions were reversed on appeal in the Ha-
worth, Foulke and Marr cases, and were im-
material in the London case.
10 89 F. (2d) 261, 263 (1937).
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"other legal relations." But it may
safely be said that the term "rights and
other legal relations" was intended to
include the Hohfeldian jural relations
of rights, privileges, powers and immu-
nities, and their correlative duties, no-
rights, liabilities and disabilities. This
the courts have now established.
II
The insurance cases which have at-
tracted most attention to the declara-
tory judgment are those in which the
company institutes an action against
the insured, joining or not joining the
injured parties, for a declaration that
the company is not under a duty to de-
fend or to pay any eventual judgment,
because the injury or death is not
within the coverage of the policy or be-
cause the company has some defense
which exempts it. The courts, especially
those of New Hampshire and the fed-
eral courts, having at once conceded
that the issue presented a "case" or
"controversy," made the propriety of
issuing the declaration turn on ques-
tions of policy and discretion in trying
the issue of non-liability or limited lia-
bility before the suit of the injured
person had been litigated to judgment,
and raised the question whether that
suit should be stayed or the company
be relegated to its defense in that suit.
Inasmuch as the many questions in-
volved in that type of case will occupy
11 Cf. American Life Insurance Co. v. Reese
Smith Stewart et al., 300 U. S. 203 (1937).
12Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc., 92 F. (2d) 406 (1937). See also Rydstrom v.
Mass. Accident Co., 25 F. Supp. 359 (1938), where
insured sued in federal court for declaration
that a "non-cancellable disability" policy was
in force, whereas company simultaneously sued
in state court for cancellation and rescission.
McCabe v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
the major part of our attention, it
seems preferable to take up first some
of the minor questions which have re-
cently been before the courts on a peti-
tion for a declaratory judgment.
Whether Policy Had Attached or Is in
Force
Either the insured or his beneficiary
or the company, before or after loss,
may have reason to claim that the pol-
icy had or had not attached or is or is
not in force. The equitable proceeding
for cancellation is conditioned upon a
number of requirements, such as evi-
dence that a remedy at law is unavail-
able, 1 whereas the action for a declara-
tory judgment, being neither distinctly
equitable nor legal and not requiring
proof that another remedy- is unavail-
able, may be employed whenever a
useful purpose will be served. Thus,
in the Stephenson case, the company
having contended that the insured had
recovered from his disability, dis-
avowed any liability under the disabil-
ity and double indemnity provisions,
tendered return of the premiums, de-
manded a return of the disability bene-
fits already paid, and a return of the
policy for cancellation of the respective
clauses. Thereupon the insured sued
the company for a judgment declaring
the policy in full force and effect. 12
Circuit Judge Parker, in one of the best
and Standard Accident Insurance Co., 4 A. (2d)
661 (N.H. 1939), (that either defendant A's or
defendant B's policy was in force at time of acci-
dent). Honetsky v. Russian Consol. Mut. Aid
Soc., 114 N.J.L. 240, 176 Ati. 670 (1935) (that con-
tract still valid and subsisting). Cf. Frasch v.
London & L. Fire Insurance Co., 213 Cal. 219, 225,
2 P. (2d) 147 (policy obtained from insured by
agent who had no license and absconded with
company funds, including plaintiff's premium).
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opinions in the Federal Reporter, cor-
rectly concluded that the declaratory
action was an alternative remedy, that
the insured could have proceeded at
law or in equity, that both declaratory
and coercive relief could be sought in
one action and that all the issues could
conveniently be determined in one
trial.
So the company, seeking to avoid
present or future liability under a pol-
icy, may sue either for a cancellation
of the policy in equity or for a declara-
tory judgment that it is void or no
longer in force. This was the case in
the famous Aetna Life v. Haworth liti-
gation13 in which the company sought
a declaration that the defendant was
not permanently and totally disabled
as he claimed, hence not relieved from
the obligation of paying further pre-
miums, but that the failure to pay the
premiums entitled the company to re-
gard the policy as lapsed. Although
two lower federal courts had errone-
Possibly suit in equity might lie to declare the
policies still in force. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S.
670, 680 (1933). Cf. Missouri Cattle Loan Co. v.
Great Southern L. Insurance Co., 330 Mo. 988,
52 S.W. (2d) 1 (1932), discussed in Borchard,
Declaratory Judgments (1934) 491.
13 Supra note 2.
14 New York Life Insurance Co. v. London, 15
F. Supp. 586 (D. C. Miss. 1936) (whether defend-
ant had recovered from arthritis, and was no
longer disabled); Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Young, 18 F. Supp. 450 (D. C. N. J. 1937)
(whether driver had permission of insured);
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Lougee,
196 Atl. 267 (N. H. 1938) (that agent had no au-
thority to contract insurance); B. & M. Mutual
Casualty Co. v. Paquette, 21 F. Supp. 858 (D. C.
Maine S. D., 1938) (that policy was void for con-
cealment of true ownership of car). Trinity
Universal Ins. Co. v. Cunningham, 25 F. Supp.
801 (W. D. Mo. 1938) (claim that policy had
lapsed because insured had suffered suspension
of certificate of convenience and necessity for
non-payment of fees); Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Havens, 24 F. Supp. 460 (M. D. Pa. 1938) (that
policy had expired at time of accident). Great
ously assumed this very concrete dis-
pute not to constitute a "case" or "con-
troversy," the United States Supreme
Court in a unanimous decision which
is bound to exert great influence, held
the issue justiciable in every sense. Nor
did the circumstance that the issue
turned on a question of fact, the total
and permanent disability of the insured
at a certain date, militate against a de-
claratory judgment.1 4 Many of these
cases turn on issues of fact, e. g.,
whether coverage existed by reason of
use, agency, or other attachment of the
risk. The Federal Act includes a pro-
vision for optional trial by jury on in-
terrogatories of disputed questions of
fact. The reluctance of some courts
after a loss to permit equitable cancel-
lation in the absence of special circum-
stances, on the ground that legal de-
fenses are available," should be and in
some instances has been overcome by
the institution of an action for a decla-
ration of invalidity. 6
American Indemnity Co. v. Richard, 5 A. (2d) 674
(N. H. 1939) (that truck involved not covered).
Penn. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Forcier, 24 F. Supp. 851
(E. D. Mo. 1937), affd 103 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A.
8th 1939) (that policy had lapsed or had been
surrendered). Insured Life Fund Co. v. Ward,
77 P. (2d) 890 (Cal. App. 1938) (that policy was
not in force). Before loss, equity had long per-
mitted actions for cancellation of policies ob-
tained by fraud: Commercial Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. McLoon, 14 Allen 351 (Mass., 1867);
Globe Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Reals, 79
N. Y. 202 (1879).
15 Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hurni Packing
Co., 263 U. S. 167 (1928); cf. American Life Insur-
ance Company v. Stewart, 300 U. S. 203 (1937),
and Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Richmond, 107
Conn. 117, 139 Ati. 702 (1927). A few courts have
disallowed the declaratory action, preferring to
relegate the company to its legal defenses in the
negligence action. Cf. Utica Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Beers Chevrolet Co., 294 N. Y. S. 82 (1937);
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.
(2d) 321 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
13 Cases cited supra note 14.
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Action by Insured or Beneficiary to
Establish Claim or Interest
It has already been observed that
the insured or beneficiary may prefer
the simple declaratory action, which in
California, Kentucky, and Michigan,
and now under Federal Rule 57, may
be advanced on the calendar, to the
more cumbersome action for a money
judgment or other coercive relief. Prac-
tically all these cases were susceptible
of adjudication by some other proced-
ure, and all involved either construc-
tion of the policy or other contractual
relationship. Thus, we find an action by
the insured to establish that he is still
a member in good standing of a mutual
benefit society, and entitled to certain
disputed privileges; 1'7 an action by
beneficiaries of a life policy claiming a
declaration that the death of their
mother, the insured, by an overdose of
luminal, taken for insomnia, was an ac-
17 Honetsky v. Russian Consol. Mutual Aid
Society, 176 Ati. 671 (N. J. 1935). Also held that
he need not apply for a new policy, and that his
money recovery should be limited to the pre-
miums paid.
is Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Heme-
nover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P. (2d) 80 (1937). Cf.
Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
92 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 4th 1937). See also Up-
dike Inv. Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance
Co., 131 Neb. 745, 270 N. W. 107 (1936) (that
worker's ill-health was "accident"; so held);
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v.
Agricola Furnace Co., 236 Ala. 535, 183 So. 677
(1938) (that silicosis acquired was "accident"
and not an excluded "occupational disease" and
that defendant insurer under duty to defend
plaintiff insured against employee).
19 Frasch v. London & L. Fire Insurance Co.,
213 Cal. 219, 225, 2 P. (2d) 147 (1931).
20 Brix v. People's Life Insurance Co., 18 P.
(2d) 103 (Cal. App. 1933); 29 P. (2d) 233 (1934);
37 P. (2d) 448 (1934); 41 P. (2d) 537 (1935). See
cases on right to future payment in Borchard,
op. cit. supra note 12, at 128, 130.
The Kentucky rule in Equitable Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Branham, 250 Ky. 472, 63 S. W. (2d)
498 (1933), and Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Hampton, 252 Ky. 145, 65 S. W. (2d) 980 (1934),
seems the sounder rule. Green v. Inter-Ocean
cident bringing into force the double
indemnity clause; 8 that the company
is bound by a fire insurance policy is-
sued by a purported agent who was not
licensed and who absconded with the
premium; 9 that the insured, allegedly
permanently disabled, was entitled to
overdue installments and to a declara-
tory judgment that future payments
are also due, a judgment which the
California courts refuse and the Ken-
tucky courts grant, but which could al-
ways be limited to the period of disabil-
ity, enabling the company to reopen
the case or bring independent declara-
tory action whenever the disability
ceases;20 that plaintiff's total disability
began at a certain date; 21 that vendee,
vendor and mortgagee of a burned
building are entitled to the proceeds of
an insurance policy in a certain priority
and amount; 22 that defendant company
was under a duty to defend a suit or
Casualty Co., 203 N. C. 767, 167 S. E. 38 (1932),
denying judgment for future monthly sick bene-
fits unduly restricts the function of the declara-
tory judgment.
Cf. Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society, 92 F. (2d) 406 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937), in
which Parker, J. maintains propriety either of
suit at law for unpaid disability instalments, or
suit in equity to have policy declared in full
force and to recover past due instalments.
21 Drummond v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
28 F. Supp. 294 (D. C. Mo. 1939). Blair v. Agacia
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 121 S. W. (2d) 193 (Mo. 1938)
(that plaintiff totally disabled by arthritis, and
hence entitled to disability benefits; held for
defendant on merits). American Mutual Liabil-
ity Insurance Co. v. Agricola Furnace Co., supra
note 18.
22 Cary Manufacturing Co. v. Acme Brass &
Metal Co., 215 Wis. 585, 254 N. W. 513 (1934). Cf.
the important case of A. E. Joy Co. v. New Am-
sterdam Casualty Co., 98 Conn. 794, 120 Atl. 684
(1923), which involved the rights of contractor,
subcontractor, client hospital, etc., discussed in
Borchard, op. cit. supra note 12, at 494. Cf. Com-
monwealth ex rel. Schnader, Att'y. Gen. v.
Nelson-Pedley Construction Co., 303 Pa. 174,
154 AUt. 383 (1931). In the obverse case, an in-
surance company brought an action for a declar-
ation of its obligations to apply certain overdue
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pay an actual or eventual judgment
against the insured, notwithstanding the
company's claim of breach of warranty
or lack of coverage; 23 that plaintiff was
entitled to change the beneficiary of a
certain policy and to receive disability
benefits; 24 that a trust agreement by
which insured assigned the proceeds of
his policy in trust and changed his
beneficiary was void. 25
mi
Company Suit to Disclaim Liability
Possibly the greatest interest in the
development of declaratory procedure
has been aroused by the privilege which
it affords to the party charged or the
debtor or obligor to disavow liability or
claim exemption or relief from a bur-
den to which he may be exposed. As
already observed, equity long has rec-
ognized a legal interest in the removal
of clouds from title to real estate, but
premium payments in its several accounts with
the insured. Allyn et al. v. Penn. Mutual Liabil-
ity Insurance Co., 100 F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938).
23Malley v. American Indemnity Co., 297 Pa.
216, 146 AtI. 571 (1929), successfully claiming that
as the company had defended the first suit by
injured person against insured, company had
waived its claim of breach of warranty of owner-
ship. Court expressly recognized possibility
of other remedies no bar to the declaratory
judgment. But in Nesbitt v. Manufacturers
Casualty Co., 310 Pa. 374, 165 Atl. 403 (1933), a
somewhat similar case, the Pennsylvania court
announced that the questions raised could "be
litigated in the established course of legal and
equitable proceedings, and therefore the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act cannot be invoked."
As already observed, this is an abuse of judicial
discretion and a misconception of the statute.
Cf. Circuit Judge Parker in Stephenson v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 92 F. (2d) 406
(1937), and Circuit Judge Clark in United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Koch, 102 F. (2d)
288, 293 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
Franklin Coop. Creamery Association v. Em-
ployers Liability Assurance Corp., 200 Blinn.
230, 273 N. W. 809 (1937) (that defendant is under
duty to indemnify plaintiff for liability to em-
ployee; denied as not within coverage of policy).
Baltzan v. Fidelity Insurance Co. (1932) 3 W.
it had until recently failed to perceive
that any unjustified claim created a
legal interest in the party charged to
have the claim declared invalid. The
importance of this interest in the daily
activities of human beings was recog-
nized in the Roman law of the Middle
Ages, and through France came to Scot-
land, whence it found its way into Eng-
land and now to the United States,
where it is receiving its widest develop-
ment. It goes back to the elementary
fact that a person wrongly accused has
a legal interest in asking his accuser to
come forward and prove his claim or
ever thereafter remain silent. This has
been extended to cover slander of title,
reputation and credit and all claims or
demands, burdens or imposition, ema-
nating from a defendant in a position to
prejudice the plaintiff. Instead of
awaiting the pleasure of the defendant
in bringing his demand or claim to
W. R. 140 (Saskatchewan), aff'd (1933) 3 W. W. R.
203 (that plaintiff's assistant's negligence in let-
ting patient fall off table was malpractice, and
that defendant, though refusing to defend plain-
tiff in patient's suit was under duty to pay even-
tual judgment; so held).
Southern Underwriters, defendant-appellants,
v. Dunn, 92 F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) (de-
claratory action to have defendant declared
under duty to defend suits brought in Oklahoma
against plaintiffs, as "other assured" and to de-
clare defendant's duties; decided on merits for
defendant-appellants). McCabe v. Hartford Ac-
cident and Indemnity Co., supra note 12 (that
defendant A's policy had attached and that it
and not defendant B was under duty to defend).
Ostroff v. New York Life Insurance Co., 104 F.
(2d) 986 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939), (that company
could not contest disability insurance for fraud
after two years and that company was under
duty to waive premium during period of dis-
ability).
24 Kline v. Central Life Insurance Co., 103 F.
(2d) 130 (1939, C. C. A. 7th).
25 Sigal v. Hartford National Bank and Trust
Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 At. 742 (1935). Cf. Ferris v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co., 272 N. Y. S.
781 (1934), dismissed because issue as to defend-
ant's interest in proceeds of plaintiff's deceased
husband's life policy was res judicata.
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adjudication, equity has found that so-
cial peace is promoted by taking under
judicial cognizance the desire of the
party charged or in jeopardy to be re-
lieved of the peril, the insecurity and
the uncertainty created by an unjust
claim, actual or potential.
The procedure for declaratory adju-
dication has thus served as a stabilizer
of legal relations. In spite of the in-
ability of the English Court of Appeal
in the celebrated case of Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Hannay26 to fit this de-
mand for relief from insecurity into the
traditional definitions of "cause of ac-
tion," they nevertheless sustained the
claim as a legal interest worthy and sus-
ceptible of judicial protection and hence
necessarily as a "cause of action." The
British courts have now gone so far
beyond the cautious and often contra-
dictory remarks of the three judges
who decided the Guaranty Trust case,27
that it is often misleading for our courts
to quote selected passages from the
three opinions rendered.
28
The possibility of a party charged or
in jeopardy to initiate the action for
declaratory relief made it necessary to
revise the ancient conception that only
the creditor has a legal right to proceed
and therefore a "cause of action." It
made it necessary to revise ancient con-
ceptions that courts act only to redress
committed wrongs or "threatened"
26 [1915] 2 K. B. 536 (C. A.).
27 Cf. Ruislip-Northwood U. D. C. v. Lee, 145
L. T. R. 208 (K. B. 1931) (that plaintiff sanitary
authorities were privileged to tear down the de-
fendant's converted railroad cars used as houses,
on the ground that they were "temporary" build-
ings under the authorizing statute. The declara-
tion saved the necessity of proceeding at their
own risk, subject to civil and perhaps criminal
liability if the court should after demolition find
wrongs. It made it necessary to recog-
nize that unjust claims or clouds con-
stituted operative facts warranting judi-
cial protection for the party prejudiced
or jeopardized, whether called a
"wrong," a claim, a demand, a cloud,
or a danger. Thus, the conception of
"cause of action!' must be broadened
beyond the demands of a creditor or
of a person in imminent danger of ir-
reparable injury to include the de-
mands of a debtor or party charged to
be relieved of an unjust claim or cloud.
By the time Aetna v. Haworth
reached the Supreme Court in 1937,
these ideas had pretty well been ac-
cepted by many of the state and federal
courts. The final blessing for the com-
pany's privilege to initiate the suit for
a declaration that the company was
not liable to the defendant, was given
by that case. After pointing out that
a suit by the insured for disability
benefits, or after repudiation of liability
by the company, a suit that the repudi-
ation was unjustified and the policy
still in force would clearly have pre-
sented a "justiciable controversy," the
Chief Justice adds that "the character
of the controversy and of the issue to
be determined is essentially the same
whether it is presented by the insured
or by the insurer ... It is the nature
of the controversy, not the method of
its presentation or the particular party
the buildings not to be "temporary").
Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Brit-
ish Bank for Foreign Trade (H. L.) [1921] 2 A. C.
438 (that the debtor plaintiff was privileged to
repay the debt in rubles and not in sterling, and
thereupon to get back the bonds as security).
28 Cf. Justice Lummus in Merchants Mutual
Casualty Co. v. Leone, 9 N. E. (2d) 552 (Mass.
1937); Judge Yankwich in Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Hubbard, 22 F. Supp. 697 (S. D. Cal. 1938).
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who presents it, that is determina-
tive.
2 9
Special facts have operated to make
this method of determining coverage
especially useful to insurance com-
panies if not indeed to the insured and
to injured persons hoping to rely upon
the policy. It is well known that at-
torneys in negligence actions seek to
get before the jury the fact that the
defendant is insured and will not him-
self have to pay the judgment recov-
ered. Where the company defends the
action or is a party this becomes obvi-
ous. But in most cases involving ve-
hicles not common carriers, the "no
action" clause of the policy or the rules
of procedure prevent the joining of the
insurer as a party defendant.3 0 There
is therefore no opportunity to assert
the defense of "no coverage" in the
negligence action, and it is not certain
that a non-waiver agreement with the
insured during the defense of the ac-
tion for negligence is always effective
protection to the company.31 When a
liability insurer conducts the defense
of a negligence action brought against
the insured without reservation of
29 The Chief Justice cited in support Gully v.
Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. (2d) 145, 149
(C. C. A. 5th) an excellent opinion; Travelers In-
surance Co. v. Helmer, 15 F. Supp. 355 (D. C.
N. D. Ga. 1936); New York Life Insurance Co. v.
London, 15 F. Supp. 586, 589 (D. C. D. Mass. 1936),
although some of Judge Brewster's views were
necessarily repudiated.
30 John A. Appleman, in an article (1938) 27
Marq. L. Rev. 75, points out that under the stat-
utes and decisions of ten states (pp. 79-80) action
may be maintained against the company by
joinder or directly where a required form of
policy is involved, before judgment is obtained
against insured, anything in the policy to the
contrary notwithstanding. He adds that in these
states the risks of increased judgments impel the
companies to increase the rates (p. 81). Wiscon-
sin and Louisiana by statute permit joinder, even
when a voluntary policy is involved. Rhode
rights or a non-waiver agreement, it is
uniformly held that the policy defense
has been waived. Again, collusion be-
tween the insured and the injured
claimant to reach the proceeds of the
policy is not uncommon.32 So, too, ex-
orbitant claims are often reduced to
figures permitting or encouraging a
settlement by the institution of an ac-
tion for a declaration of non-coverage.
For one or more of these reasons,
insurance companies have had occa-
sion to avail themselves of this oppor-
tunity to obtain relief from unjust
claims by suing the insured or his
beneficiary for a declaration of non-
liability for lack of coverage, or be-
cause the insured's breach of warranty
or condition of risk excuses them from
the obligation of paying the claim or
defending the insured against third
party claims or paying any judgment
thus obtained. The principal antici-
patory defenses which the companies
have advanced as grounds for a de-
claratory action absolving them of li-
ability or duty to defend are: misrep-
resentation as to ownership and use of
an automobile; 3  forbidden use for
Island decisions seem to permit it. Texas ap-
parently distinguishes between liability and in-
demnity policies (pp. 88-90), but gives effect to
the "no action" clause.
31 See Montgomery v. Utilities Insurance Co.,
117 S. W. (2d) 486 (Texas 1938), based on the
ground that as a corporation could not practice
law the non-waiver agreement was illegal. The
case is under certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Texas.
32 Cf. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, 25
F. Supp. 522 (D. Ore. 1938), and United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Koch, supra note 23.
33 B. & M. Manufacturers Mutual Casualty Co.
v. Paquette, 21 F. Supp. 858 (D. Maine, 1938)
(ownership by unlicensed son concealed);
Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Beers Chevrolet
Co., 294 N. Y. S. 82 (1937); Merchants Casualty
Co. v. Pinard, 87 N. Y. 473, 183 Atl. 36 (1936)
(driver had bought car from insured on condi-
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emergency,3 4 or carrying passengers
for hire,3 5 or in violation of the par-
ticular commercial purpose insured36
or of the business or pleasure clause"
or for an excluded purpose or ac-
tivity;38 that the car was driven by an
tional sale). Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v.
De Martini, 118 S. W. (2d) 901 (Texas 1938)
(insured not sole owner).34 American Motorists Co. v. Rush, 88 N. Y.
383, 190 AUt. 432 (1937). American Casualty Co.
v. Windham, 26 F. Supp. 261 (M. D. Ga. 1939)
(implied permission of assured; company bound
to defend employee, but not his friend who drove
car). Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Richards,
27 F. Supp. 18 (D. C. Oregon, 1939) (personal
mission).
35 American Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty
Co. v. Wilcox, 16 F. Supp. 799 (W. D. N. Y. 1936);
Central Surety and Insurance Corporation v.
Caswell, 91 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937);
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v.
Hearn, 233 Ala. 31, 170 So. 59 (1936); Ocean Ac-
ceptance and Guaranty Corporation v. Myers,
22 F. Supp. 450 (M. D. N. C. 1938), aff'd 99 F.
(2d) 485 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938); Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Martin, 88 N. Y. 346, 189 AtL. 162 (1937);
American Fidelity Co. v. Proveneher, 3 A. (2d)
824 (N. H. 1939); Merchants Mutual Casualty Co.
v. Leone, 9 N. E. (2d) 552 (Mass. 1937). State
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Wise, 277
Mich. 643, 270 N. W. 165 (1936).
36 Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Gordon, 95
F. (2d) 605 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938) (truck used to
tow trailer); Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Du-
pont, 21 F. Supp. 606 (D. Del. 1937) (hauled scrap
iron, not produce); Associated Indemnity Co. v.
Manning, 92 F. (2d) 168 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) (not
insured business); Farm Bureau Mutual Auto
Insurance Co. v. Daniel et al., 92 F. (2d) 838
(C. C. A. 4th, 1937) (did not cover A's truck
because used for non-covered purpose); Same
case, 104 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939); Em-
ployer's Liability Assurance Corp. v. C. E.
Carnes & Co., 22 F. Supp. 259 (W. D. La. 1937)
aff'd 101 F. (2d) 739 (1939) (carried explosives,
not farm machinery).
37 Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Plummer, 13
F. Supp. 169 (S. D. Texas 1936); Western Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Odom, 21 F. Supp. 574, (N. D.
Texas, 1937); State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Co. v. Wise, 277 Mich. 643, 270 N. W. 165 (1936)
(racing); Columbia Casualty Co. v. Thomas,
101 F. (2d) 151 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Glens Falls
Insurance Co. v. Dolese Bros. et al., March 17,
1939,... F. Supp.... (W. D. Okla.)
3SLumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Gieri,
23 F. Supp. 435 (M. D. Pa. 1938) (without con-
sent); Central Surety & Insurance Co. v. Smith,
190 AUt. 704 (N. H. 1937) (use without insured's
consent); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Greenough,
88 N. L 391, 190 Atl. 129 (1937); Sauriolle v.
O'Gorman, 86 N. L 39, 163 At. 717 (1932); Ameri-
unauthorized or prohibited driver 0 or
that the territorial clause was vio-
lated;40 or that the person injured was
not covered or an entitled beneficiary.4 '
The company may claim that the dis-
ease contracted was not within the coy-
can Casualty Co. v. Windham, 26 F. Supp. 261
(D. C. M. D. Ga. 1939) (consent implied).
39 Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Beverfor-
den, 93 F. (2d) 116 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Ohio Cas-
ualty Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169 (S. D.
Texas, 1935); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Young
18 F. Supp. 450 (D. C. N. J., 1937); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance Co., 23 F.
Supp. 433 (M. D. Pa., 1938), rev'd 101 F. (2d) 514
(C. C. A. 3rd, 1938); Universal Indemnity Insur-
ance Co. v. North Shore Delivery Co., 100 F.
(2d) 618 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) (license revoked by
expiration); Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Brazen,
27 F. Supp. 582 (D. C. Pa., 1939) (implied con-
sent); Merchants Casualty Company v. Pinard,
87 N. H. 473, 183 AtL 36 (1936); Wolverine Mutual
Motor Insurance Co. v. Clark, 277 Mich. 633, 270
N. W. 167 (1936) (driven by defendant's excluded
son); Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. De
Lozier, 196 S. E. 318 (N. C. 1938); American Em-
ployers Insurance Co. v. Wentworth, 5 A. (2d)
265 (N. H. 1939) (jury found implied consent);
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Dunn,
7 A. (2d) 246 (N. H. 1939) (ibid).40 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Martin, 88 N. H.
346, 189 At. 162 (1937); Glens Falls Ind. Co. v.
Dolese Bros. et al., supra note 37.
41 Continental Casualty Co. v. Buxton, 88 N. H.
447, 191 Atl. 1 (1937) (passenger guests); Utica
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Langevin, 87 N. H. 267,
177 Atl. 549 (1935) (guest held covered); Utica
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Glennie, 230 N. Y. S. 673
(19238) (coverage denied, because injured person
not an employee); Indemnity Insurance Co. v.
Kirsch, 28 D. & C. (Pa.) 630 (1936) (effect of om-
nibus clause); American Motorists Insurance Co.
v. Kopka, 88 N. H. 182, 186 At. 335 (1936) (that
"bodily injuries" does not include father's claim
for medical expenses for injured son); Merchants
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Drown, 199 Atl. 568 (N. H.
1938) (whether injured employee was under
Workmen's Compensation Act, hence company
excluded from obligation to defend); Shelby
Mutual Plate Glass & Casualty v. Lynch, 2 A. (2d)
307 (N. H. 1938) (ibid); National Liberty Insur-
ance Co. v. Silva, 92 P. (2d) 161 (N. Mex., 1939)
(that insured had burned their own property);
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Pier-
son, 97 F. (2d) 560 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Shrigley, 26 F.
Supp. 625 (D. C. Ark., 1939) (wife's injury not
"bodily injuries"); but within coverage of policy,
although not "bodily injuries," Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Yeroyan, 5 A. (2d) 726 (N. H.
1939); Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Geist, 270
Mich. 510, 259 N. W. 143 (1935) (father-in-law
excluded from coverage).
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erage of an accident policy,4 2 that there
is in fact no total or permanent dis-
ability and hence no duty to waive
premium payments or pay disability
benefits; 43 that a death was not "acci-
dental.14 4 The company may demand
a declaration that the coverage had
terminated.': 5 Quite common are the
cases in which the company in a de-
claratory action contends that some
conduct or misconduct of the insured,
such as the failure to cooperate in the
defense of a third party action 6 or
wrongful admission of liability or con-
nivance4 7 or misrepresentation as to a
material fact 48 or change of occupation
increasing risk"' or failure to notify the
company of a suit brought against the
insured"0 operated to release the com-
pany from its liability under the policy.
Even before the Haworth case, the
42 Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hamera, 292
N. Y. S. 811 (1936) (silicosis). In Globe Indem-
nity Co. v. Sterling Stewart Corp., 13 N. Y. S.
(2d) 678 (1939) it was held that the onset of sili-
cosis was not "accidental."
43 Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300
U. S. 227 (1937); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Hel-
mer, 15 F. Supp. 355 (N. D. Ga. 1936); Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co. v. Hobeika, 23 F.
Supp. 1 (S. C. 1938); New York Life Insurance
Co. v. London, 15 F. Supp. 586 (D. C. Mass., 1936).
44 Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v.
Foulke, 89 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); New
York Life Insurance Co. v. Roe, 22 F. Supp. 100
(W. D. Ark., 1933) rev'd 102 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A.
8th, 1939); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Drum-
heller, 25 F. Supp. 606 (W. D. Mo., 1938).
45 Anderson v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 89 F.
(2d) 345 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) (that group policy
had lapsed); American Motorists Insurance Co.
v. Central Garage, 86 N. H. 362; 169 Atl. 121 (1933)
(that it had been validly cancelled); Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Pearson, 24 F. Supp. 311 (W. D.
Mo. 1938) (lapsed). Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.
v. Murphy, 28 F. Supp. 252 (D. C. Ky. 1939) (term
only four months, not one year, hence lapsed).
See also cases, supra note 14.
46 Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Keliher, 88
N. H. 253, 187 Atl. 473 (1936); Commercial Cas-
ualty Insurance Co. v. Humphrey, 13 F. Supp.
174 (S. D. Texas, 1936); Pacific Indemnity Co. v.
McDonald, 25 F. Supp. 522 (D. Ore., 1938). In
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 99 F.
(2d) 665 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), this ground was
New Hampshire and several lower fed-
eral courts had recognized the complete
justiciability of such a suit. After the
Haworth case all doubts were removed.
There have remained, however, a num-
ber of questions of policy on which the
courts are not all agreed, and which in
part depend on such varying facts that
the issue is not always determinable
a priori. The main differences in the
courts have arisen on the question
whether the plaintiff company should
be allowed to pursue its state or fed-
eral remedy for relief from liability
while a suit for negligence against the
insured is already pending in the state
courts, where the company had an op-
portunity if not indeed the contractual
duty to defend its insured. The com-
pany maintains, however, that it is not
bound for lack of coverage or for some
associated with a claim that insured doctor's
criminal performance of an abortion absolved
the company.
47 Central Surety & Insurance Co. v. Caswell,
91 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A.
4th, 1937); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald,
supra note 46.
48 General Ass. F. & L. Ass. Corp. v. Becker, 300
N. Y. S. 638 (1937) (misrepresentation as to
health, suicide soon after issuance of policy);
Carpenter v. Edmonson, 92 F. (2d) 895 (C. C.. A.
5th, 1937) (policy claimed void for false answers
in application); Manufacturers Casualty Insur-
ance Co. v. Roach, 25 F. Supp. 852 (D. Md. 1939)
(address, garage, use); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Monahan, 26 F. Supp. 859 (D. C. Okla., 1939)
(double indemnity for accident not covered by
suicide, expressly exempted).
49 Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Williams, 88 F.
(2d) 929 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
50 American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Busch,
22 F. Supp. 72 (S. D. Cal. 1938); Merchants Mu-
tual Casualty Co. v. Leone, 9 N. E. (2d) 552
(Mass. 1937); Ohio Casualty Co. v. Marr, 21 F.
Supp. 217, (N. D. Okla., 1937), afFd 98 F. (2d)
973 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938) on extraordinary
ground that company had not pleaded or proved
"accident"; cf. criticism of this decision (1939)
48 Yale L. J. 1284; Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Sammons, 99 F. (2d) 323 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938);
Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Alexander,
103 F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (delayed no-
tice was nevertheless "immediate notice").
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other good reason and wishes to avoid
the necessity and expense of defending
a negligence action from the conse-
quences of which it claims complete
exemption.
The question arises whether the
courts should deny a preliminary or
independent action on this issue of per-
sonal liability and thus force the com-
pany to assert its immunity in connec-
tion with its defense to the negligence
action against the insured, or compel
the company to risk standing on its
conviction of immunity, let the negli-
gence action, perhaps improperly or
even collusively defended by the in-
sured, go to judgment, and then make
its defense in an action for indemnity
on the judgment (under statute in
some states) or in an action by the in-
sured or injured person in garnishment
or, under some statutes, directly or
jointly with the insured. By refusing
to defend, the company loses all oppor-
tunity to contest the negligence of the
insured or the injured person's right to
recover, and exposes itself to a charge
of breach of contract. By defending, it
incurs considerable expense and may
waive the claim of immunity.
It is therefore of exceptional im-
portance to both insurer and insured,
if not indeed to the injured person, to
know at the earliest possible moment
whether the policy covers the loss or
not. The liability under the policy and
the liability for negligence are indeed
51 Wolverine Mutual Motor Insurance Co. v.
Clark, 277 Mich. 633, 270 N. W. 167 (1936; United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Savoy Grill,
1 N. E. (2d) 946 (Ohio App. 1936).
52 Cf. Vance, Handbook on the Law of Insur-
ance (2d ed., 1930) 685-6. This seems to be the
rule in Michigan, and is invoked by the court
in the Wolverine case as a ground for relegating
two separate transactions. While in
general the parties in interest are the
same, the company is not usually, ex-
cept for statute, a party to the negli-
gence action. It may be important,
therefore, to try the question of im-
munity separately. This is especially
so where an impecunious or complais-
ant insured is involved who will readily
admit liability and accept judgment
against him pro-confesso, both he and
the injured person realizing that the
real parties in interest are none other
than the company and the injured per-
son. If the company were exempt,
there might be no law suit for alleged
negligence. Moreover, the insured or
injured person may delay his suit, as
in the Haworth case, and it might work
an injustice entailing loss of evidence,
the setting up of reserves and other in-
convenience and suspense to have to
await the pleasure of the insured or in-
jured person to commence the action.1
In some states, indeed, the company's
defense of the suit for negligence is a
bar against any later disclaimer of li-
ability in the subsequent action for in-
demnity.52
Naturally, the company should not by
a declaratory action, often inaccurately
called an action in equity, be allowed
to deprive the defendants of a jury
trial. All the issues of fact, practically
always present in these cases, can be
tried by a jury; the federal Declaratory
Judgments Act and the rules or prac-
the company to its defense of the negligence ac-
tion. Th court considered that the declaratory
action could make no final determination of in-
surer's liability, for it might be changed by the
estoppel consequent on defending the action for
negligence. But this seems unsound, for it
compels the company to assume risks rather
than aids the parties in avoiding risks.
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tice in the states provide for the sub-
mission of such issues to a special jury.
And even though a jury in equity may
be deemed "advisory" only, this is not
the case with a jury in the declaratory
action. Inasmuch as a responsible in-
sured person should be able to rely
upon the company's help in defending
him against third party claims, it may
in some cases work injustice to compel
him to defend two suits, one by the
company for non-liability and one by
the injured person for negligence, al-
though after he wins the first he will
not be alone in defending the second.
Where an action by several injured
persons is already pending in a state
court and the company has complete
opportunity to assert its immunity in
one action, and great inconvenience to
several injured persons would be
caused by compelling them to defend a
federal action for immunity, there may
on the. balance of convenience in ex-
ceptional cases be a sound reason for
declining to exercise federal juris-
diction.
Two Suits
Let us now see how the courts have
dealt with this difficult question of two
suits and the propriety of a preliminary
suit for a declaratory judgment. Courts
which erroneously wish to restrict the
53 Wolverine Mutual Motor Insurance Co. v.
Clark, 277 Mich. 633, 270 N. W. 167 (1936). See
also, State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v.
Wise, 277 Mich. 643, 270 N. W. 165 (1936). Cf.
vigorous criticism of the Michigan decisions(1937) 16 Mich. L. Rev. 236-43; United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Savoy Grill, supra
note 51; Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Beers
Chevrolet Co., 294 N. Y. S. 83 (1937) (The court
was influenced in the adverse use of its supposed
discretion, by somewhat loosely employing the
inaccurate view of James v. Alderton Dock
Yards, 256 N. Y. 298, 176 N. E. 401 (1931), that if
declaratory judgment to the functions
of an extraordinary remedy, like those
of Michigan and Pennsylvania, nat-
urally exercise their discretion in rele-
gating the plaintiff company to its de-
fenses in the common law action for
negligence. *Expressed in its harshest
terms, we find the denial of a declara-
tory action for company immunity ex-
plained as follows by the Michigan
Supreme Court:
"The question of plaintiff's liability on
the policy depends on a single issue of
fact, whether Clark's son was driving
or in control of the car which hurt S.
Its liability to pay cannot accrue until
S has judgment against Clark. Then, if
Clark pays the judgment, his remedy
against plaintiff will be an original ac-
tion on the policy. If Clark does not
pay, S's remedy against plaintiff will be
in garnishment. Both remedies are at
law, with right to trial by jury. Plaintiff's
defense is legal and has no equitable
features, and can be made in either law
action as completely as it could be made
in the present proceeding."5
3
Possibly the adherence of Michigan
to the classic distinction between law
and equity, now abolished under the
federal rules, had considerable influ-
ence on the decision. As already ob-
served, the declaratory action is neither
strictly equitable nor legal, though it
has historical roots in equity; and no
person should be denied his right to
the court thinks the parties should be left to
existing forms of action, the declaratory judg-
ment may be denied, (Rule 212), and overlooked
the more clearly expressed view in Woollard v.
Schaffer Stores Co., 272 N. Y. 304, 5 N. E. (2d)
829 (1936). The court also thought the action an
escape from a jury trial, and that other actions
might be based on the same accident. General
Acc. F. & L. Assur. Corp. v. Becker, 300 N. Y. S.
638 (1937) (that defendant insured should be
made a party to suit brought by injured party
against plaintiff insurance company).)
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a jury trial of issues of fact if he de-
sires it. The assumption that he might
by declaratory procedure be denied his
right to try issues of fact before a jury
was in part responsible for the refusal
to grant a declaration in a few federal
and state cases.5 4
In Michigan, it seemed to make no
difference to the court whether the
negligence suit had already been
brought or not.5 5 Where the suit by the
insured or injured person has not yet
been brought, there seems to be no
reason for denying the declaratory
judgment.5 6 In most of the federal
cases the suit in the state court had al-
ready been started or the issue arose
on a motion to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction. While as a rule the pendency
of a suit in another court involving the
precise issues is a ground for denying
a declaratory judgment, in many of
these cases the identical issues are not
involved, for the insurer is not a party
to the negligence action but on the con-
trary wishes a declaration of release;
or he claims more immunity under the
policy that is placed in issue by the
negligence action. In the recent case
of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Con-
sumers Finance Co.,57 Judge Watson
thought that even though no damage
suit had yet been commenced in the
state court, the company could as con-
veniently and at no greater expense try
the question of immunity in defending
54 Besides Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Beers
Chevrolet Co., supra (note 53), see Aetna Casual-
ty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. (2d) 321, (C. C.
A. 4th, 1937); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Helmer,
15 F. Supp. 355 (N. D. Ga. 1936).
55 In the Wolverine case it was only threat-
ened; in the Wise case it had been instituted.
56 District Judge Trimble in New York Life
Insurance Co. v. Roe, 22 F. Supp., 1000 (D. C.
the insured in the seven actions which
the court anticipated, and, a more con-
vincing ground, that a decision in the
federal action would not necessarily
conclude the issue whether the negli-
gent driver was insured's agent, and
would not help to terminate the litiga-
tion unless it was in plaintiff's favor,
whereas the injured persons would be
exposed to the expense of defending an
additional lawsuit. The court reached
these conclusions without knowing in
what states the injured persons would
sue, although the insurance company's
position may vary in different states.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment, but declined to enjoin
the institution of the negligence actions.
In the Quarles case, 8 Mrs. Quarles
sued her husband, insured, in a South
Carolina court, for damages arising out
of an auto accident. Thereupon the
company began its federal suit for a
declaratory judgment that inasmuch as
the insured had failed to cooperate with
the company in defending what the
company considered a collusive suit,
the company was not bound to defend
the negligence action. Thereafter Mrs.
Quarles recovered judgment against
her husband and began an action at
law against the company in the state
court to recover the amount of that
judgment. It was in that situation that
the District Court, affirmed by the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, concluded that
W. D. Ark. 1938) rev'd 102 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A.
8th, 1939) sustained the motion to dismiss the
declaratory action because defendants would
probably bring a suit to establish double indem-
nity liability.
57 23 F. Supp. 433 (M. D. Pa. 1938), reversed
in 101 F. (2d) 514 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938).
58 Supra note 54.
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it would be better to let 1rs. Quarles'
South Carolina suit against the com-
pany go to trial and not to draw prac-
tically the identical action, with parties
reversed, into the federal courts. That
seems a correct decision. The issue was
not the coverage of the policy or
whether the company should be forced
to defend a negligence action in the
state courts, but the bona fides of a suit
.which had been instituted in the state
courts and the validity of the com-
pany's defense in the action brought
against it by Mrs. Quarles. Clearly
there was no useful purpose served by
trying this pending issue in a new fed-
eral action513
So, where judgment had been recov-
ered against the insured in an Illinois
court and attorneys had been engaged
to file garnishment proceedings against
the insurance company, the federal
court was right in refusing to exercise
jurisdiction of a declaratory action of
69 And it is probable that Judge Myers was
correct in dismissing on authority of the Quarles
case, the suit of the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Hobeika, 23 F. Supp. 1 (D. C. E. D. S. C.
1938) for a declaration of no-duty to waive pre-
mium payments or pay disability benefits on the
ground that insured was not permanently and
totally disabled, because the South Carolina suit
involved the identical issue (parties reversed)
and the federal suit would not settle the con-
troversy.
In Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Murphy, 28
F. Supp. 252 (D. C. Ky. 1939) the court held that
the question whether defendant was employee
of insured or independent contractor could be
tried in state court to better advantage. In Ohio
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Richards, 27 F. Supp.
18 (D. C. Oregon, 1939) Judge McColloch was
inclined to, but did not dismiss a declaratory
action for non-coverage where the company was
simultaneously defending an action for negli-
gence in the state courts, calling attention to the
burden on litigants to travel long distances to
the federal court.
In Central Surety & Insurance Co. v. Caswell,
91 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) it is intimated
that if it is clear that there is "a plain, adequate
and complete remedy at law," equity would have
no jurisdiction. The court considered the declar-
the company to establish non-liability,
since the garnishment proceeding was
ancillary to the original state action
and the company's liability could be
fully adjudicated in that proceeding.60
Where identical issues and parties are
involved in the state suit and no prac-
tical or useful purpose can be served
by deciding the case in the federal
courts, it is wise policy, especially since
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,6 not to
exercise the court's admitted jurisdic-
tion.
With those few exceptions, practi-
cally every federal and state action
for a declaratory judgment of non-
liability has been sustained as proper
procedure. As a rule the issue of duty
to defend or bear liability was not di-
rectly raised in the suit for negligence
against the insured. But Circuit Judge
Hutcheson in a thoughtful opinion
6 2
gave expression to the dictum that
even if the same issues and parties
atory action an equitable action, but it is not
strictly so. The new federal rules expressly state
that the existence of another remedy is no ground
for denying a declaratory judgment.
60 American Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Freundt, 103 F. (2d) 613 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939). Cf.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Koch,
supra note 23.
61304 U. S. 64 (1938).
62 Carpenter v. Edmonson, supra note 48. In
fact, the first decision was reached in the
Alabama state court in 1938. In Lumber-
men's Mutual Casualty Co. v. De Lozier, 196
S. E. 318 (N. C. 1938), the court declined to stay
the negligence action, so that both proceeded.
The company offered to defend only on condi-
tion that it did not thereby waive its right to
deny coverage. The court said that the injured
person was not interested in the controversy
between company and insured as to company's
duty to defend. Cf. dictum in American Motor-
ists Insurance Co. v. Busch, 22 F. Supp. 72 (D. C.
S. D. Cal. 1938) that identical issues in state
court might persuade the federal court to decline
jurisdiction, if the state remedy is adequate. Nor
were identical issues a bar where a stipulation
had been entered into. Southern Underwriters
v. Dunn, 96 F. (2d) 224 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
Special circumstances of unusual delay in the
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were involved, assuming the federal
court had jurisdiction, the two suits
might run along simultaneously, first
decided being res judicata. This does
not seem good policy, for identity
of issues and parties should foreclose
the exercise of an after-acquired fed-
eral jurisdiction. But certainly where
there is no complete identity, the fed-
eral suit is appropriate. Several courts
have considered it logical and ex-
pedient to decide in a separate declara-
tory action the preliminary question of
the company's duty to defend or its
immunity under the policy, on the
ground that this simplified the litiga-
tion. Even the company's defense of
the state suit has been considered no
bar to a federal action for a declaration
of no-duty to defend or to pay an
eventual judgment;" not even recovery
of a state judgment has had that ef-
fect,614 although the same issue ought
not to be tried again.
Until recently the federal courts had
with considerable liberality granted in-
state proceedings persuaded Judge Clark for the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in a notable
opinion to allow a federal declaratory action on
the issue of coverage. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Koch, supra note 23. Cf. dis-
cussion, supra pp. 252-3.
63 Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bever-
forden, 93 F. (2) 166 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937);
Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v.
Foulke, 89 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Ohio
Casualty Company v. Gordon, 95 F. (2d) 605
(C. C. A. 10th, 1938); Ocean Accident & Guaranty
Corp. v. Myers, 22 F. Supp. 450 (M. C. N. C.,
1938), aff'd 99 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
In these cases it may be assumed that all the
issues presented could not have been tried in
the state action.
64American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Igo,
22 F. Supp. 393 (E. D. Ky. 1938); Ohio Casualty
Co. v. Gordon, supra note 63; nor the assignment
of the policy by the defendant to a resident of
the plaintiff company's state of incorporation to
defeat federal jurisdiction. Phoenix Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. England, 22 F. Supp. 284 (W. D.
Mo., 1938).
junctions against the continuance of
the action for negligence in the state
courts until the federal action for non-
coverage had been decided.65 For rea-
sons already cited, this seemed to pro-
mote economy in judicial administra-
tion; even without injunction insured
and injured persons often preferred to
await the outcome of the main issue of
coverage. Several courts at least
thought the stay of the negligence ac-
tion merely a matter of policy.6
Where the federal injunction against
the state action has been granted, not-
withstanding what seems like an ex-
press prohibition in Section 265 of the
Judicial Code,6 7 it may have been done
thoughtlessly or under the second ex-
ception laid down by Justice Van
Devanter in Wells, Fargo & Co. v.
Taylor,5 namely, to protect a federal
jurisdiction properly acquired. Lately,
however, three federal circuit courts
of appeal have held that there is no
justification, in view of Section 265, for
enjoining the action in the state court
65 Cf. Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bever-
forden, supra note 63; Central Surety & Insurance
Co. v. Caswell, 91 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937),
(probably based on apparent collusion); C. E.
Carnes & Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp., 101 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. Tighe, 24 F. Supp. 49 (N. D.
Cal. 1938).
66 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Hearn, 233 Ala. 31, 170 So. 59 (1936). A Te:as
court declined to stay its own state suit, because
a federal declaratory action -was pending. Trin-
ity Universal Insurance Co. v. De Martini, 118
S. W. (2d) 901 (Texas Civ. App. 1938). But it is
doubtful whether a state court could enjoin a
federal action for negligence. Central National
Bank v. Stevens, 169 U. S. 432 (1898).
67 "The writ of injunction shall not be granted
to stay proceedings in any court of a State
[except in bankruptcy cases]."
68 254 U. S. 175 (1920). See Durfee and Sloss,
Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State
Courts (1932), 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1167. Taylor
and Willis (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 1169; Charles
Warren (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 345.
1939] DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AND INSURANCE LITIGATION
for negligence.6 9 This will result in the
two suits running along simultane-
ously. In spite of the deprecation of
an unseemly competition, a race for
priority in judgment is pretty sure to
occur, unless, as already indicated, the
injured parties voluntarily defer the
state action. But where they do not,
the federal action has an advantage in
the possibility of advancement on the
calendar. Only to the extent that some
incidental issue may be identical would
the first judgment be res judicata. But
apart from the fact that the declaratory
action would not afford the injured
parties full relief, there are many rea-
sons why delay should not be imposed
upon them by injunction. Even the
concurrence of two actions will prob-
ably not, as the Harvard Law Review
assumes,7 0 deter companies from insti-
tuting actions looking to a declaration
of non-coverage, for many reasons exist
for invoking that relief quite inde-
pendently of the grant or denial of in-
junction of the state action.
Declaration of Limited Liability
Closely related to the actions claim-
ing a declaration that the company is
not liable are the suits in which the
company may claim, either against the
69 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 99
F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) relying on Kline
v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance
Service, 101 F. (2d) 514 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938);
Central Surety & Insurance Corp. v. Norris,
103 F. (2d) 116 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Glens Falls
Indemnity Co. v. Brazen, 27 F. Supp. 582 (D. C.
Pa. 1939). In New York Life Insurance Co. v.
Roe, 102 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), where
Company sought declaration that death was not
accidental and subject to double indemnity, the
court declined to enjoin an anticipated state
action by beneficiaries on ground that both
actions would be in personam for money only.
70 52 Harv. L. Rev. 528 (1939).
insured or against another insurance
company that it is liable only to a lim-
ited extent or liable only secondarily
after another company's primary li-
ability has first been established and
liquidated.
Thus, in a multiple accident where
some only of the injured persons have
pursued their claims to judgment or
settlement, the company may claim
against the others threatening or initiat-
ing suit a declaration that it is liable
to all claimants only to the amount of
the policy.7 1 Or, even before the first
judgment has been paid or settled, the
company may implead the insured and
all the contingent claimants and seek
a declaration of its liabilities to each
and if necessary ask for a pro rata di-
vision.7 2  These suits are not always
the equivalent of equity actions in in-
terpleader, because the claims may not
all arise out of the policy but include
independent creditor's rights, or the in-
sured may not be altogether disinter-
ested.73 So, the company may admit a
limited liability, but ask a declaration
of immunity for any excess demanded,
e. g., that the risk assumed extended
only to a non-hazardous occupation
and not to the hazardous one later en-
tered upon 4 or that the death arose
71 Ohio Casualty Co. v. Gordon, supra note 63.
72 New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hyde, 148
Ore. 229, 34 P. (2d) 930 (1934); Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co. v. Holmes, 87 N. H. 272, 178 Atl.
258 (1935); Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Kirsch,
28 D. & C. (Pa.) 630 (1936).
73 New York Life Insurance Co. v. Laws, 81
F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); Conn.
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Stewart, 22 F. Supp.
68 (1938).
74 Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Williams, 88 F.
(2d) 929 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937). Cf. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indemnity Co. v. White, 7 A. (2d) 258
(N. H. 1939) (that annual bonds were not cumu-
lative, and that one payment barred additional
claims).
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from natural and not accidental causes,
thus rejecting the applicability of the
double indemnity clause75 or that par-
ticular claims for indemnity are unjus-
tified."'
Even more interesting are the de-
claratory actions brought against each
other by insurance companies directly
or by joinder or intervention claiming
a declaration of no liability to share
risks or responsibility for a loss7 7 or
limited7M or contingent liability79 only
or contributionY° In the recent case
of Maryland Casualty Company v.
Hubbard and the Employers Liability
Assurance Company,"' Judge Yank-
wich of the federal District Court of
California, Central Division, had oc-
casion to render a brilliant opinion
touching several aspects of this devel-
oping branch of the law. The owner
of an automobile had obtained from
the defendant Employers Liability As-
surance Company a public liability pol-
icy containing an omnibus clause, cov-
ering persons driving with the owner's
consent. One Blackwell, employed by
Ridgeway Audit, Inc., was thus driving
the car in New Mexico when he in-
jured the defendant Hubbard. Hub-
bard sued Blackwell and his employer,
Ridgeway Audit, in the state court at
75Columbian National Life Insurance Co. v.
Foulke, supra note 63. Cf. Stephenson v. Equit-
able Life Assurance Society 92 F. (2d) 406 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1937); defense that policy now only
covers extended term insurance. New York Life
Insurance Co. v. Roe, 102 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A.
8th, 1939) (excessive serum injection for undu-
lant fever, not accidental but disease death).
76 American Motorists v. Kopka, 88 N. H. 182,
186 Atl. 335 (1936).
77 Farm Bureau Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v.
Daniel (Home Indemnity Co., intervening) 92 F.
(2d) 838 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937) where insured's
suit had not yet been brought but intervenor
insurer admitted coverage asserting plaintiff
company also bound, which plaintiff denies by
Los Angeles for negligence. The plain-
tiff Maryland company had issued to
Ridgeway Audit a non-ownership pub-
lic liability policy. Both policies
obliged the company to defend actions
against the insured. In the state ac-
tion the Employers Liability Company
had been called on to defend the action
but refused, denying liability. There-
upon, the plaintiff Maryland company
instituted in the federal district court
an action for a declaration that its pol-
icy constituted excess coverage only,
after the defendant Employers Liabil-
ity Company's primary coverage, so
that the plaintiff was liable only after
the Employers Company policy had
been exhausted.
The defendant-insurer moved to dis-
miss on the ground that there was no
privity between the two companies;
that only after the injured person had
secured a judgment against the Ridge-
way Audit and the Maryland company
paid it, would it be subrogated to what-
ever right Ridgeway had against the
defendant Employers Liability Com-
pany; and that inasmuch as that right
was merely contingent and future,
there was no basis for a declaratory
judgment.
Judge Yankwich denied the defend-
declaratory action.
78 Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. American Surety
Co., 313 Pa. 145, 169 AUt. 226 (1933). Two sureties
litigate liability for state deposits in insolvent
bank. Asserting co-suretyship plaintiff claimed
that it was liable only for limited amount already
paid. Court denied co-suretyship and limitation
below face of policy. Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Lynch, 2 A. (2d) 307 (N. H., 1938).
79 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hubbard and Em-
ployers Liability Assurance Co., 22 F. Supp. 697
(S. D. Cal., Cent Div. 1938).
s0 New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co. v.
Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Assoc., 206 N. C.
95, 178 S. E. 875 (1934).
8122 F. Supp. 697 (S. D. Cal. Cent. Div. 1938).
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ant-insurer's contentions and held the
case fully appropriate for a declaratory
judgment. Privity between the par-
ties he considered unnecessary. A lia-
bility that is contingent, if threatened
and tangible, is sufficient to give the
plaintiff a legal interest in declaring
its non-existence. No demand to de-
fend is necessary to create such a legal
interest; the facts indicate the plain-
tiff's jeopardy, which the right of sub-
rogation establishes. It was not neces-
sary to make the owner of the car a
party, when the negligent driver was a
party. The court relied heavily on the
striking case of Post- v. Metropolitan
Casualty Insurance Co.8 2 in which the
insurer was not liable under the policy
until the insured railroad, then hope-
lessly insolvent, had paid at least $25,-
000 in judgments. Several negligence
actions were pending against the rail-
road, and one judgment for $7,500 had
been recovered. This, added to the
amounts claimed in the other actions,
would exceed $25,000. The insurance
company having denied liability until
$25,000 had been paid, the receiver
sought a declaration that the insurer
was liable for the excess notwithstand-
ing the railroad's inability to pay the
minimum $25,000. The New York Ap-
pellate Division paid high tribute to
the declaratory action as a means of
solving this precarious, even though
contingent, relationship. The insecur-
ity was tangible and practical, and that
made it sufficiently ripe to warrant de-
claratory relief. In the Hubbard case,
the contested issue of priority in lia-
bility was clearly justiciable and ripe
82237 N. Y. S. 64 (1929) aff'd. 254 N. Y. 541,
173 N. E. 857 (1930), discussed in Borchard, op.
for adjudication, quite apart from the
consideration that it was not determin-
able in the state action where the
Maryland company could not be joined.
The plaintiff Maryland company, in
danger of prejudice from the state ac-
tion, sought a declaration of its priv-
ilege not to defend, thus avoiding the
risk of acting on its own views alone,
and a declaration that its liability was
conditional only. This the court
thought entirely sustainable. The only
questionable part of the opinion is the
suggestion that the plaintiff in whose
favor it was deciding had no "cause
of action," which the judgment itself
refutes.""
Parties
The question of proper parties has
troubled the courts on several occa-
sions. Section 11 of the Uniform Act
provides that "all persons shall be made
parties who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by the dec-
laration, and no declaration shall prej-
udice the rights of persons not parties
to the proceeding." The procedure for
declaratory judgment vests in the
courts a considerable discretion to in-
sist upon joining and impleading, or
at least serving, all parties they dleem
interested or likely to be affected by
the decision. The reason is that the
judgment might not otherwise termin-
ate the controversy, which is the pri-
mary purpose of the proceeding.
In the Maryland v. Hubbard case,
Judge Yankwich considered the de-
fendant-insurer if not an indispensable,
at least a proper party, for in equity
cit. supra note 12, at 493-4.
s3 Supra pp. 248-50.
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all persons having an adverse claim
may properly be joined.8 4  In some
cases the insured has been deemed an
indispensable party,85 but not necessar-
ily all the injured parties.8 6 In other
cases, where the insured is irrespon-
sible and is a mere conduit between the
company and the injured persons, it
may be less important to have the in-
sured a party defendant than at least
some of the injured persons. The is-
sue, in the writer's opinion, should not
turn, as the Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Beverforden case assumed, on
any difference between the Uniform
Act and the federal Act, which is silent
on these technicalities of procedure.
These, it was intended, were to be left
to ordinary rules of pleading and prac-
tice, including joinder, which in the
federal courts is now controlled by
Rule 18. The important question is
whether the adjudication would have
84 It seems an unduly narrow construction for
the Vermont Supreme Court in Town of Man-
chester v. Town of Townshend, 192 Atl. 22 (Vt.
1937) to have denied a declaratory judgment for
misjoinder of parties defendant where the
plaintiff impleaded three defendants, one of
whom should have borne the burden of support
of an indigent resident. The issue depended on
residence. The dissent seems sounder. The action
was dismissed because the three defendants were
said to lack a community of interest. Of course
the injured persons are "proper" parties,
Builders & Manufacturers Mutual Casualty Co.
v. Paquette, 21 F. Supp. 858, 863 (D. Me. 1938).
85 Auto Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Dupont, 21
F. Supp. 606 (D. C. D. Del. 1938) (where federal
jurisdiction was declined, because insured, not
a party, was in Virginia. Suit in Virginia court
was deemed necessary. In Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co. v. Cieri, 23 F. Supp. 435 (M. D. Pa.
1938), the insured were considered necessary
parties. See Appleman (1937) 23 A. B. A. J. 553,
557. Yankwich, J. considered one insured, owner
of the car, not an indispensable party in
Maryland Casualty Co v. Hubbard, supra note 79.
86 Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bever-
forden, 93 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937). Injured
party's husband and sister, who had also sued
driver in the state court for negligence were not
deemed "necessary parties" to federal action for
declaratory judgment of non-liability for lack
substantial effect in terminating the
controversy; that leaves room for judi-
cial discretion as to who must be
joined.
Burden of Proof
A few collateral questions have
arisen in these cases which it may be
of interest to note. In New Hampshire,
which has been most receptive to de-
claratory action by insurance compan-
ies disavowing liability, we have had
conflicting decisions on the question of
burden of proof. In the Greenough
case 7 there was contradictory testi-
mony as to whether or not the car was
-being driven with the owner's consent.
Finding the evidence equally balanced,
the appellate court held that the bur-
den of proving that the use of the car
was within the coverage of the policy
was on the plaintiff in the negligence
action and that the reversal of the par-
of coverage. See 51 Harv. L. Rev. 926 (1938).
Contra: Central Surety & Insurance Corp. v.
Caswell, 91 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance
Service, 101 F. (2d) 514 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1938). It
may be well to join injured persons, for they
are often the real parties in interest. In Con-
tinental Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cochrane,
Commissioner, 89 Colo. 462, 4 P. (2d) 308 (1931),
the court thought that inasmuch as policyholders
were not parties to an action for the construction
of the company's policies, the declaratory judg-
ment "would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy" and therefore dismissed. Ex parte
Hirsch's Committee, 245 Ky. 132, 53 S. W. (2d)
211 (1932) (insurance company a necessary party
to suit for disability benefits). Kline v. Central
Life Insurance Co., 103 F. (2d) 130 (C. C. A. 7th,
1939) (assignee of life policy not "indispensable
party" in suit against company claiming priv-
ilege of changing beneficiary).
s7 Travelers Insurance Co. v. Greenough, 88
N. H. 391, 190 Atl. 129 (1937). Cf. 37 Col. L. Rev.
1007 (1937). In Merchants Mutual Casualty Co.
v. Kennett, 7 A. (2d) 249 (N. H. 1939), dismissed
for poor pleading, the court held that the burden
of proof rests where it would have rested had
the company been a defendant; yet if it merely
seeks "an order to show cause" against a de-
fendant who as yet has made no adverse claim,
its petition is defective.
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ties in the declaratory action did not
change it. It is well-known that the
risk of non-persuasion is usually on the
plaintiff. Yet in actions invoking af-
firmative defenses it is often placed on
the defendant."' It is not always easy,
certainly from the form of the plead-
ings, to determine what is an affirma-
tive defense, a question usually de-
pending on considerations of expedi-
ency or fairness. Inasmuch as the com-
pany's claim of immunity is in reality
negatively defensive, there seems no
impropriety in leaving the burden of
proof on the normal plaintiff, the in-
sured or injured person. Yet in a more
recent case,"9 in which the company
sought to disavow the authority of its
agent to contract insurer's liability, the
New Hampshire court distinguished
away the Greenough case and held that
by voluntarily assuming the position of
plaintiff in opening and closing the case,
the company had assumed the burden
of proof. But this can better be ex-
plained by suggesting that the relations
between the company and its own
agent are of such a character that the
company and not the injured person
may properly be required to prove
their true nature.
In some recent federal cases the
Greenough case has been either ex-
pressly or by implication disregarded.
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Drum-
ssWilson v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., 210 N.
C. 585, 188 S. E. 102 (1936). In Lumbermen's
Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. McIver, 27 F.
Supp. 702, 704 ( D.C. Cal. 1939) the company
plaintiff alleged that the driver was a girl of 14,
hence illegally driving. Evidence showed that
she was being instructed by adult who grabbed
wheel at time of accident. The court held that
affirmative assertion that girl was driving was
a "special defense" throwing burden of proof on
company. Court found as fact that girl was not
heller,9 ° the insurer sued the benefici-
ary of an accident policy for a declara-
tion that the death of the insured with-
in four days of a severe automobile
wreck was not due to the accident, but
to natural causes. Judge Otis held that
when the company assumes the posi-
tion of plaintiff it must assume the bur-
den of proving its allegations by a pre-
ponderance of evidence. But in de-
clining to follow the Greenough case
the court was hardly justified in con-
cluding that the federal Act in author-
izing "an affirmative declaration of the
'rights' of the parties" was different in
content from the New Hampshire Act
which authorized a declaratory judg-
ment "to determine the question as be-
tween the parties." Judge Otis was
probably correct in his view on the
burden of proof, but mainly because
the presumption that a death within
four days of a serious accident is due
to the accident is so great that he who
would overcome it should prove it. So
in Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, '
it was not unnatural to throw upon the
insurer plaintiff the burden of estab-
lishing the allegation that the insured
and his guest had conspired to defraud
the insurer. Yet in Employers' Liabil-
ity Assurance Corp. v. C. E. Carnes9 -
it was proper to hold that the insured
defendant or person claiming under the
policy had the burden of proving that
driving. Although actually giving declaratory
judgment against plaintiff, the court erroneously
seemed to believe that it was denying a declara-
tion in the court's discretion.
89Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Lougee, 196 Atl. 267 (N. H. 1938). Cf. note in 109
A. L. R. 1100.
9o 25 F. Supp. 606 (W. D. Mo. 1938).
9125 F. Supp. 522 (D. Oregon, 1938).
92 24 F. Supp. 128 (D. La. 1938); aff'd 101 F.
(2d) 739 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
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the insurer's representative knew that
insured was carrying the explosive
butane gas and thus estopped insurer
from denying coverage. In all these
cases the burden is on him who would
overcome a natural inference or pre-
sumption.
Public Questions
Insurance is necessarily a contract
subject to the strictest governmental
supervision. Statute and administra-
tive control subject the insurer to a
myriad of regulations, including many
of the terms of the insurance contract.
It is therefore hardly avoidable that
questions frequently arise between in-
surer and the public authorities as to
the scope of the insurer's privileges and
immunities. These may arise directly in
suits against the insurance commis-
sioner, claiming the privilege of includ-
ing certain clauses93 or contracting cer-
tain types of insurance94 or establishing
that life insurance agents are not "em-
ployees" within a state unemployment
insurance act 5 or indirectly in suits
against the insured challenging the
powers of the Commissioner or the val-
idity of his acts."
One of the most recent cases involved
a question that has widespread interest,
93 Continental Mutual Insurance Co. v. Coch-
rane, Insurance Commissioner, 89 Colo. 462, 4 P.
(2d) 308 (1931); General Insurance Co. v. Ham,
Insurance Commissioner, 49 Wyo. 525, 57 P. (2d)
671 (1936) (privilege to include certain rider;
held within administrative discretion of the
Commissioner).
94Northwestern National Insurance Co. v.
Freedy, 201 Wis. 51, 227 N. W. 952 (1930) (priv-
ilege of organizing casualty company). United
Order of Foresters v. Miller, 178 Wis. 299, 190
N. W. 197 (1922) (privilege of changing by-laws).
In Lawrence v. American Surety Co., 263 Mich.
586, 249 N. W. 3 (1933), the state treasurer sought
by declaration to test the validity of certain
clauses.
far beyond its immediate application.
A glazier in New Jersey made con-
tracts with his customers to service
glass store fronts and replace broken
glass for stated periods at a specified
consideration. He was indicted by a
grand jury at the request of the public
prosecutor for engaging in the insur-
ance business without complying with
the provisions of the insurance law,
which carried heavy penalties. The
Commissioner of Banking and Insur-
ance and the prosecutor had threatened
to institute criminal proceedings under
this indictment." The glazier there-
upon brought an action for a declara-
tory judgment maintaining that his
business was not an insurance business
and that he was exempt from the pro-
visions of the insurance law under
which he was indicted. In addition, he
sought an injunction against the im-
pending criminal prosecution. He se-
cured both. So Justice Bailey in the
District of Columbia was sound in de-
claring that the Group Health Associa-
tion was not engaged in the "business
of insurance" and hence violating the
criminal law.98
In enjoining the criminal prosecu-
tion, sometimes deemed unusual, or de-
claring given business conduct privi-
95 Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Tone, Commissioner, 4 A. (2d) 640 (Conn. 1939).
Cf. the miscarriage in the identical type of issue
in State ex rel. Ernst, Director of Social Security
v. Superior Court for Thurston County, ... Wash.
... , 87 P. (2d) 294 (1939), where prohibition was
denied, but declaratory action recommended.
96 American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Central
Garage, 86 N. H. 362, 169 Ati. 121 (1933) (power
of Commissioner to rule the policies in force,
after company's notice of cancellation).
97 Moresh v. O'Regan, County Prosecutor, 120
N. J. Eq. 534, 187 Ati. 619 (1936).
98 Group Health Assn. v. Moor, Superin-
tendent of Insurance, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D. C. 1938).
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leged and licit, the court recognized the
fact, often overlooked, that business
men who claim that their conduct is
legally privileged and does not expose
them to the charge of violating penal
statutes are not congenital criminals
and should have the privilege of test-
ing the application of the statute to
their business in a civil suit. They are
thereby assuming the burden of estab-
lishing the truth of their contentions
by a preponderance of evidence and
relieving the public prosecutor of the
burden of establishing their guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Where the
constitutionality of a statute, even pe-
nal, is in doubt, there has been no diffi-
culty in permitting directly interested
persons to challenge its constitution-
ality by declaration; there is no sub-
stantial difference in placing in issue
the legal validity of a course of busi-
ness conduct. The suggestion of some
courts that such actions can be tried
only on the criminal side involves, in
the writer's opinion, short-sighted and
defective administration of justice.
A fairer view was taken by the Mis-
souri Supreme Court in the recent de-
claratory action of six large casualty
companies against the members of a
Bar Association committee who had
charged that casualty adjusters were
practicing law in Missouri in violation
of the criminal law.9  In a long opin-
ion analyzing the various activities of
the adjusters, the court held that the
general drawing of releases and con-
99 Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. et al. v. E. N.
Jones, General Chairman of Bar Committees of
the State of Missouri, et al., decision filed May 2,
1939.... Mo...., 130 S. W. (2d) 945. The Circuit
Court decision of Judge W. M. Dinwiddie was
modified. For documents in the case the writer
is indebted to Hogsett, Murray, Trippe, Depping
tracts, advice as to legal rights, general
-appearance before workmen's compen-
sation commissions and the presenta-
tion of contentions, and the general de-
termination of legal liability, constitute
the practice of law; whereas the detec-
tion and discovery of witnesses and
evidence, taking witnesses' statements
and photographs, appraisal of damage,
informing insured of company attor-
ney's legal opinion, procuring execu-
tion and filling out of prepared instru-
ments, including selection of the ap-
propriate form of release, an offer of
settlement and payment of money in
discharge of a claim and determination
of amounts to be set up as reserves, ex-
pressing opinion to employer on extent
of liability, attending Workmen's Com-
pensation Commission conference to
reach amicable settlement of claim, do
not constitute the practice of law. This
procedure was a sensible method of
determining the legal validity of a ser-
ies of activities which at best are some-
what difficult of classification and at
worst might have laid the foundation
for criminal charges.
IV
These are among the principal in-
surance issues which in recent years
have been adjudicated by declaratory
judgment. Practically all involved
questions of construction, often de-
pending on questions of fact. Some of
them might have been decided under
and Houts. Cf. Richmond Ass'n. of Credit Men
v. Bar Assoc. of Richmond, 167 Va. 327, 189 S. E.
153 (1937) declaring that the practice of the credit
association in selecting attorneys to make collec-
tions for customers and fixing fees, and sharing
fees without the customers knowing the identity
of the attorneys, was the practice of law.
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traditional procedure; many of them
were not susceptible of such adjudica-
tion. Where a declaration was substi-
tuted for a coercive remedy, the public
and the private interest have profited,
for a conciliatory temper has been sub-
stituted for hostility, speed of deter-
mination has been enhanced and ex-
pense diminished. Where in actions
for a so-called "negative" declaration
of non-liability judgments have been
obtained, a new field of judicial relief
has been opened up which has met
some of the demand for the removal of
uncertainty, insecurity, and peril from
legal and business relations. In the
cultivation of this method of litigation
there lies great hope for the develop-
ment of preventive justice and the
friendly adjudication of legal issues
without the breach of economic and so-
cial relations which the weapons of co-
ercive relief necessarily entail. Ap-
plied with the natural sympathy that
the procedure enjoys in England, it
should aid in the promotion of social
peace and the efficient administration
of justice.
